![]() ![]() Now, granted, the key derivation function is PBKDF2 with 100000 iterations ( HKDF), but that won't help with a 4 digit pin.īitwarden seems to be aware that PINs are low-entropy and that many PIN guesses are a problem: the client allows only 5 PIN unlock attempts. This brute-force will very likely be successful, since PINs are usually very low-entropy. The attacker can check whether decryption of \(c\) succeeds using the guessed PIN. This means if an attacker can at any point gain access to the encrypted vault data stored on the device the attacker can brute-force the PIN: \[c = \mathrm\) is a key derivation function. Then a secret derived only from the user's email and PIN will be used to encrypt the master vault key. I also don't know if any of this applies to the Windows or MacOS clients, you may test it for yourself.Īlso don't freak out about this too much, Bitwarden is (as far as I can tell) a good password manager, and you should definitely continue to use it I just wish they'd warn about the risks of using the PIN feature more clearly. ![]() a modal warning), as they're setting the feature up. Unfortunately I could not find any changes to the client (as of ), that would warn a user about this (with e.g. The warning seems to exist since September 2022, but back then it was buried at the very bottom of the page. If you are worried about attack vectors that involve your device's local data being compromised, you may want to reconsider the convenience of using a PIN. Using a PIN can weaken the level of encryption that protects your application's local vault database. Since the writing of this post Bitwarden has updated their documentation about the PIN feature:
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